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For over a decade Chris Firestone and Nathan Jacobs have played a significant role, both as
authors and editors, in making a case for a theologically "robust" reading of Kant, in which
his engagement with theological concepts and religious doctrines is treated as integrally
connected with the overall trajectory of his work. It is a reading seen as applicable not only
to pre-critical and critical writings focused on religion and theology but also, and more
significantly, to the main lineaments of critical philosophy. The twelve essays in this volume,
edited in collaboration with James Joiner, are organized under th ree headings- "Kant and
God," "Kant and Religion," and "Kant and Redemption"-and move that case forward on a
number of theological and philosophical fronts.
Since a short review is unable to do full justice to the range of issues in the volume, I
focus first on one essay in each section that I found offering the most insightful claims and/or
provocative arguments, particularly with respect to interpretive trajectories that continue
to consider Kant's theological importance (if any) to be a negative one-i.e., views in which
Kant's strictures on human knowing provide the purifying argumentative fire to which
philosophy should doggedly subject theology's con ceptual feet. These discussions will be
followed by a section surveying key points from the other essays, particularly ones indicating
directions for further philosophical probing of the theological Kant- and/or theological
probing of the philosophical Kant!
Pablo Muchnik's essay, "The Birth of God and the Problem of History," focuses on
Kant's treatment, in Idea for a Universal History and Conjectural Beginning of Human History,
of the relationship between nature and providence in the unfolding moral trajectory of
human history. Muchnik proposes a correlation between, on one hand, Kant's account of a
history in which humanity is called upon to become "of age" morally and, on the other, an
understanding of God congruent with such growing moral maturity. He argues that Kant
presents that correlation as one in which humanity, in taking upon itself the task of maturing
into autonomy, makes possible "the birth of God"-i.e., "a moment in human consciousness
when the notion of an inscrutable deity is replaced by a new, thoroughly moral conception
of the divine" ( 48). On this reading, in which Kant recognizes "the need to embrace a dynamic
conception of the divine to harmonize the teleology of nature and the teleology of freedom"
(51), Muchnik sees him putting forth "a daring thesis ...that only an evolving conception of
the divine could preserve the intelligibility of history and the dignity of humanity" (51 ).
Muchnik then posits an affinity between Kant and Nietzsche's Zarathustra in that both see
that "with God both guilt and evil are also born" (55)-a point from which Kant, at least,
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draws the conclusion that "any successful vindication of God's goodness must at the same
time be a vindication of our own humanity" (55). Muchnik sees this as the basis for a
distinctive Kantian theodicy founded on "the fundamental anthropological fracture Kant
called 'unsociable sociability"' (56). Muchnik's account is provocative on at least two counts:
first, it locates the conceptual center of gravity of Kant's vindication of God's goodness in
Kant's anthropology and philosophy of history; and, second, it suggests a theological account
of evil deeply rooted in the dynamics of the human formation of the concept of God.
In "Religious Assent and the Question of Theology: Making Room for Historical Faith,"
Lawrence Pasternack, who has written extensively on Kant's concept of "faith," explores the
character and implications of "Kant's dramatic commitment to Pure Rational Faith in the 8Preface to the first Critique" (100). This exploration provides a basis for a claim that "faith
rather than knowledge is, for Kant, the mode of assent proper to religion" (105). To support
this claim Pasternack explicates Kant's defense of Pure Religious Faith by highlighting the
importance of two positive features: first, that "it engages the will in a way that is not possible
for other modes of assent" (107) and, second, that "[because] faith can, unlike knowledge, be
chosen, in faith one achieves a cognitive state as the result of one's moral interest" (107). The
latter point, which Pasternack sees operative in Kant's argument for the Highest Good in the
first Preface to Religion, is significant. It is not just that faith fills some kind of cognitive "gap"
that theoretical reason cannot cross, making it "a fall back in the light of limits to theoretical
knowledge" (109). It is rather that "our acceptance of the Highest Good and its Postulates
make possible a commitment to the Moral Law that, if not for, faith, we could not have" (109,
emphasis added). In larger terms, this means "not merely that practical reason can go where
the theoretical cannot go, but that the former has a 'prerogative' to do so." This prerogative
is thus "what it means for practical reason to have 'primacy' over the theoretical" (109).
Pasternack then turns to the relationship between Pure Religious Faith and the contents of
"historical faith"; in accord with his earlier work, he argues for a more integral and nuanced
connection between the two than usually proposed by accounts in which the image of husk
or shell is the controlling trope for the function and value of historical faith. Such a
connection allows him to see Kant as affirming Providence in terms of"a concursus in history
[in which] God facilitates our efforts [to attain the Highest Good] through appropriately
timed miracles and revelation" (116). This provides a context for the case Pasternack makes
for historical faith as a form of "holding-to-be true" (Fiirwahlhalten) rather than a belief "as
if," a point put unambiguously in a footnote: "the work that has been done on Kant's
conception of Pure Rational Faith should now make it clear that it is a full-fledged holding
to-be-true, a conviction with certainty, rather than some practically grounded self
deception" (117). Pasternack's account is provocative for the robust role that it assigns to
the practical interest of reason in the assent proper to faith, a role that opens a path for
theological reflection on Providence that enables us "to see our lives as part of a history
advancing toward the Highest Good" (117).
In "What Perfection Demands: An Irenaean Account of Kant and Radical Evil,"
Jacqueline Marina addresses a frequently raised criticism of Kant's treatment ofradical evil:
It harbors an unresolvable incompatibility between its two basic claims, one about the
universality of radical evil, the other about moral responsibility for radical evil. According to
the first, radical evil is a moral disposition attributable, without exception, to every member
of the human species. According to the second, moral responsibility for that disposition lies
in each agent's free choice: "This disposition [radical evil] must be adopted through the free
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power of choice, for otherwise it could not be imputed" (183). Marina states the
incompatibility thus: " .. .if we are truly free to choose our moral character, then prima facie
we are not warranted in cla iming that all human beings (all those that have existed, and those
yet to be born) will have a morally corrupt disposition" (183). The response she offers to this
criticism is intriguing, particularly on methodological grounds, in that it points to an
important, but often overlooked, dimension of almost any philosophical engagement (not
just Kant's) with "the question of theology": Attention should be paid to the models and
tropes functioning in the formation of particular theological and philosophical
conceptualities. In the instance ofradical evil, Marina draws attention to this dimension and
its importance by noting that more than one model of th e origin and overcoming of evil has
entered into Christian theology during its long history. While the model associated with
Augustine, in which "human beings, fully formed and in the presence of God .. .inexplicably
turn away from God and fall into evil" (185), has been the dominant (though not
unchallenged) one, there are others, including an older, important, and still influential one
associated with Irenaeus. In this model, the origin of evil and sin is located in human
immaturity. Marina proposes that many interpreters have too readily assumed that the
model Kant follows is the "Augustinian" one; in its stead, she proposes a developmental
model along Irenaean lines that she sees in Kant's Lectures on Philosophy of Religion and the
Conjectural Beginnings essay. She concedes that Kant's later discussion in Religion of the
radical character of evil presents significant complications to a straightforward lrenaean
model. To engage these complications, she sets forth a nuanced reconstruction of the account
Kant gives, in Religion, of the interrelated roles played in humanity's struggle with evil by the
elements in Kant's account: The "fundamental disposition" as a "freely chosen bas ic principle
expressive of the complete orientation of the individual" (192); the "predispositions
determining human nature" as well as their "corresponding incentives" (194); and the
propensity as "it has to do with how things can matter to us, and the kinds of importance we
assign to our affairs" (196). She articulates Kant's discussion as a phenomenology of human
moral frailty that is "woven into human nature in terms of the infancy of the species, so that
every human being, even the best, will be affected by the propensity to evil" and concludes,
in Irenaean fashion, that "when confronted with the enormity of the moral task, the human
conditions of frailty and finitude tempt to both impurity and perversity without thereby
necessitating them" (200).
The following overview of the other essays indicates points deserving further
investigation and/or threads connecting them with the essays treated above.
Nathan Jacobs's essay, "Kant on Divine Revelation: An Assessment and Reply in the
Light of Eastern Church Fathers," offers a criticism of Kant's anthropology and its consequent
restrictive view of t he dynamics and possibility of revelation based a theological tradition
not often engaged as a conversation partner for Kant's work: The anthropology and
epistemology articulated in the writings of the Eastern Church Fathers. Jacobs draws upon
this tradition for an ontology of the human person, particularly in terms of the intellectual
capacities (nous) it bears as created in the image of God, and of the role played by divine
energies in the human participation in the divine nature called theosis (divinization). By
locating "divine revelation in the ontology of man"-in contrast to making it, as Kant sees it,
a matter of empirical knowledge-Jacobs sees the theology of the Eastern Fathers providing
a way to pose crucial questions that Kant leaves open about "human and divine ontology"
and their bearing upon the "nature of revelation itself' (180).
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In "Rational Religious Faith in a Bodily Resurrection," the line of interrogation that
Chris Firestone employs to engage Kant's account of the key Christian doctrine of bodily
resurrection consists of both philosophical and theological elements. The aim of this
interrogation is "to consider whether the doctrine of bodily resurrection is a viable element
of rational religious faith even if Kant himself did not include this doctrine in his own
development" (228). After an overview of recent Kant scholarship exploring the theological
development of Kant's thinking represented by Religion, Firestone proposes the
methodological/interpretive principle that "the doctrines of rational religious faith that
emerge in Religion are a direct result of a theological method that puts the perspectives of
philosophy and theology into dialogical conflict" (2 3 7). He articulates four premises of this
method (p. 238), which he then employs in arguing to the conclusion that "Kant must give
his critical consent that the rational end of man is immortal existence in an embodied state
in which happiness is proportionate to virtue" (24 7). Both the methodological principles
Firestone elaborates, as well as the particular argument and conclusion he proposes, deserve
more extended discussion.
In "Divine Agency and Divine Action in Immanuel Kant," William Abraham, writes
from a theological perspective "interested in the renewal of robust editions of Christian
doctrine" (138). He offers a theologically generous reading of Kant-notably with respect to
the possibility of speaking about particular divine actions-based on what Abraham argues
to be Kant's own theological commitments. He stresses, in company with other essays in the
volume, the importance of Kant's account of humanity and human nature as a marker of
those commitments. These provide space to speak in general terms of "divine creation and
divine providence [and] ... a general revelation given within the moral conscience of human
kind' (157). Yet even in this space, Kant's critical strictures on human knowing-which
Abraham vividly images as "a shovel used for all too long to beat them [theologians] into
submission"-still "disposes of any talk about specific divine action that goes beyond his
pretty meager catalogue" (158). He thus urges theologians to "reject the shovel" to make it
possible to "retrieve precisely those wonderfully rich accounts of particular divine actions
that are so badly needed for the health of the church and the world in the present" (158).
The contributions of Keith Yandell, "Atonement and Grace in Kant: Some Reflections,"
and Thomas McCall, "Christology within the Limits of Reason Alone? Kant on Fittingness for
Atonement," engage (among other topics) questions of the function and value of historical
i.e., contingent-facts and claims for Kant's "moral radication of religion " 1 and their
implications for his larger enterprise. These questions are framed in reference to their
bearing on the intelligibility of the core Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the
Atonement (McCall) and their coherence with the larger lineaments of Kant's moral theory
(Yandell). McCall is quite clear that he takes Kant's view to be that the historical "Jesus of
Nazareth of Nazareth is not of vital soteriological importance" (216), a point with which, in
a comment about the atonement, Yandell agrees: "These [the Cross, the Exodus] are
Kantianly irrelevant, matters of history, not of moral religion" (211). More generally, McCall
concludes, after considering some alternative Christological proposals, that "Kant cannot be
considered a friend of traditional Christology, but nor can he be taken seriously as genuine

I borrow this term from Ja mes Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion (New Haven & London, Yale
University Press: 1967), 129.
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threat to it" (227), while Yandel presents a list of seven conclusions, of which the most
succinct and challenging might very well be that "Kant has no theory of atonement" (212).
Both James DiCenso, in "Practical Cognition of God," and James Joiner, in "The Kantian
Summum Bon um and the Requirements of Reason," examine dimensions of the central role
Kant gives to the practical use of reason as the basis for human affirmation of God. DiCenso
provides an account of "Kant's approach to theology [that] stresses the primacy of practical
reason and its realization by autonomous beings" (34), an approach he sees at work in
Religion and all three Critiques. His account provides a useful basis for further articulation of
Kant's understanding of "moral theology," and of the importance of autonomy, as enacted
moral subjectivity, for the social instantiation of the realm of ends: "the human capacity to
exercise freedom is decisive for the asymptotic realization of ends in the world" (30). Joiner
places his account of practical reason in the context of Kant's "moral argument," leading to
an examination of the meta-ethical placement of Kant's views in relation to the moral
realist/moral constructivist divide. He then argues, provocatively, that "radical evil" presents
a new antinomy for which Kant may need to articulate a further postulate, that of the
"prototype" of morally perfect humanity, such as that proposed in the work of Firestone and
Jacobs.
At one level, Leslie Stevenson's essay, "Kant versus Christianity," has affinities with
what Firestone described as Kant's method in Religion, i.e., a "method that puts the
perspectives of philosophy and theology into dialogical conflict." Len ding interest to
Stevenson's use of such dialogical conflict is that he takes neither Kant's philosophy (and the
various interpretations it has generated) nor Christianity as fully stable and invariant in their
content. While conceding that "Christians have diverged on how to interpret revelation and
salvation" (126), he takes "creation, sinfulness and redemption" to remain "crucial themes"
for Christianity (131) even as it has reinterpreted matters such as "cosmic time" in the light
modern science (130). Stevenson still shares the judgment of Kant's Prussian censors that
"Kant's thought was subversive of Christianity," even while also noting the long shadow
Kant's work casts upon later theology, even to this day-and he encourages the conversation
to continue (136-137).
David Bradshaw, in "Kant and the Experience of God," focuses on Kant's arguments
that there can be no experience of God. Although defending Kant's arguments as "stronger
than they might first appear," Bradshaw further argues that "Kant seriously misunderstands
the relationship between experience of and conceptual beliefs about God, and that when this
relationship is clarified his arguments are seen as having little force" (80). Bradshaw turns
to a number of biblical accounts to make this argument, remarking that, from a biblical
perspective, "it is precisely the narrowness of what Kant thinks of as a possible experience
of God that leaps to the eye" (87). In contrast to what Bradshaw sees as Kant's model
"envision[ing] the divine as a passive object of our inspection" (90) in which God is
referenced to a concept such as "infinite goodness" - the model presented in biblical
narratives is of an encounter with God's dynamic agency, one in which "far from simply
appearing as an object that has to be assessed according to our existing conceptual
resources, God actively intervenes to expand and deepen those resources" (90-91).
Overall, a valuable contribution.
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